1. Pakistan is not a mediator. Setting up peace negotiations requires substantial knowledge of the processes and considerable experience.

2. Islamabad does not symbolize peace as a negotiation venue. Pakistan is engaged in a war with Afghanistan and does not project the necessary symbolism.

3. The objective of the ceasefire was never clear. Was it about access to humanitarian aid, the start of peace negotiations, or military elements?

4. Before negotiations begin, both sides must demonstrate confidence-building measures (CBMs). These could have included humanitarian assistance from both sides.

5. The negotiation teams were composed of officials who were too high-ranking. On the one hand, this signals seriousness about finding a solution. On the other hand, it is risky, as failure was highly likely and JD Vance could return to the United States politically weakened.

6. Without sufficient preparation, a “final and best offer” from the United States comes too early. Once a decision-maker presents a final offer, further negotiations become very difficult, if not impossible.

7. The goal was not to achieve lasting peace. The aim was to define a framework for the negotiation process. This was not achieved, and there is no timeline for possible negotiations.